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Abstract
During recessions, the U.S. government substantially increases the duration of unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits through multiple extensions. This paper seeks to understand the incentives
driving these extensions. Because of the trade-off between insurance and job search incentives,
the classic time-inconsistency problem arises. We endogenize a time-consistent UI policy in a
stochastic equilibrium search model, where a government without commitment to future policies
chooses the UI benefit level and expected duration each period. A longer duration increases the
unemployed workers’ consumption but reduces their job search incentives, leading to higher future
unemployment. We use the framework to evaluate the effects of the 2008-2013 benefit extensions
on unemployment and welfare.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. government has extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in response to higher
unemployment since the 1950s. During the Great Recession, benefit durations were extended up
to 99 weeks. A big debate in the literature is whether benefit extensions worsened unemployment
during recessions due to adverse incentives (e.g. Nakajima (2012), Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mit-
man (2015), Johnston and Mas (2016), and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2017)). At the
same time, the literature finds the optimal UI policy under the assumption of perfect government
commitment differs from the extensions policy implemented (e.g. Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)
and Jung and Kuester (2015)). We relax the perfect commitment assumption and look at a time-
consistent policy over the business cycle. We find that the time-consistent policy is both qualitatively
and quantitatively consistent with the UI extensions during 2008-2013. Furthermore, because the
endogenously generated extensions create expectations of further extensions in equilibrium, they
worsen unemployment in recessions.
Time-consistent policy has been used to study issues related to monetary policy and taxation.
Our application of the concept to UI policies is a natural way to model the decision of a government
during recessions. Because the optimal policy with commitment is not optimal ex post, there is
always incentive for the government to renege on a commitment plan, and in the absence of effective
commitment devices, the optimal UI policy under commitment is not credible.1 This is especially true
during recessions when political pressure is high for the government to act out of current interests.
We analyze the government’s choice of UI policy in an equilibrium business cycle model with
search and matching. Risk-averse unemployed workers choose search intensity in order to be matched
with job vacancies posted by risk-neutral firms. We use the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium to
characterize the decisions of a government without commitment. Because the equilibrium restricts
the government’s policy rules to depend only on current payoff-relevant states, the policies are time-
consistent. Specifically, a welfare-maximizing central government chooses the UI benefit level and
the probability that the benefit expires (“benefit exhaustion probability”) each period depending on
the current levels of unemployment and aggregate productivity.2
Modeling the benefit exhaustion probability rather than a fixed length of benefits keeps the gov-
ernment’s decision tractable. At the same time, the inverse of benefit exhaustion probability gives
the expected duration, which allows for comparison with empirical evidence on benefit extensions.
A key assumption here is that once benefits expire, the unemployed worker does not regain eligi-
bility before he finds a job. In other words, the government commits to excluding these ineligible
unemployed workers from receiving UI benefits. Under this assumption, the unemployed workers
with benefits search less than those without benefits. As a result, benefit duration policy today,
1 Section 6.4 discusses the time inconsistency issue in UI policy and the main differences between commitment and
non-commitment policies.
2 Because we want to use the model to study observed UI variations, we keep the policy parameters as close to
reality as possible. For example, we abstract from the type of employment history-dependent UI policy analyzed in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
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through changing the proportion of insured unemployed workers, directly impacts the states of the
economy (unemployment and the measure of benefit-eligible unemployed workers) inherited by the
future government and thus the future policies.
The private sector’s decisions are modeled using a search-matching model with risk-averse work-
ers, endogenous search intensity by the unemployed, and business cycles driven by shocks to aggregate
labor productivity. Unemployed workers search for jobs, while firms post vacancies. Both parties
make decisions given the government’s policy choices. Because future government policies affect
their expected future value, their decisions also depend on the expectations about future government
policies. Generous future benefit policies reduce worker’s incentives to search, which in turn low-
ers firm’s incentives to create vacancies. Since the government’s duration policy directly affects the
future states of the economy and in turn affecting the private sector’s expectations about future poli-
cies, the government’s policy decision has to take into account the effect of expectations on private
choices.
The main trade-off associated with the government’s duration policy is between insurance and
incentives. A longer duration increases the UI coverage today and thus raising the average insurance
for the unemployed workers. It also reduces the average job search through an increase in the
share of unemployed workers receiving benefits, which raises the future unemployment and alters
the private sector’s expectations about future policies. Over the business cycle, UI duration is
strongly countercyclical. In response to a drop in productivity, the expected future productivity is
low, which implies a low marginal return to production tomorrow and a low marginal gain from
job creation today. As a result, the cost of a higher expected duration is low, and the government
raises UI duration. As the unemployment rate rises, the marginal gain from increasing UI duration is
higher as more unemployed workers receive benefits, and as a result, the expected duration increases
further.3
Given these empirically consistent cyclical movements of UI policy, we then apply the model to the
U.S. economy between 2008 and 2013. We feed in exogenous job separation rates taken from the data
and calibrate exogenous labor productivity so that it matches the observed path of unemployment
rates during the period. Overall, our model matches the variations in benefit durations very well,
generating the correct timing of duration changes as well as 80% of the overall increase in UI duration.
An implication of our theory is that the Markov policy, by increasing UI duration in recessions,
contributes to higher unemployment. Using the calibrated model, we find that at the peak of
unemployment between 2008 and 2013, about 3 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate can be accounted for by rising UI benefit extensions. Of this unemployment gap, more than
3 The idea that the welfare gains and costs of UI vary over the business cycle is not new. For example, Krueger and
Meyer (2002) argue that the efficiency loss from reduced search effort may be smaller during a recession than during
a boom. More recently, Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015) empirically estimate the moral hazard cost and consumption
smoothing benefit of UI benefits, and they find that the marginal welfare cost from generous benefits is procyclical and
the marginal welfare gain is modest and varies positively with unemployment rate. While they focus on the changing
moral hazard effect of UI benefits on individual workers, we investigate the optimal government’s response to the
changing efficiency loss.
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two-thirds can be explained by unemployed workers’ expectations of longer future benefit durations.
Compared to other structural evaluations of the benefit extension, our approach allows workers and
firms to form expectations about future extension policies which are chosen endogenously by the
government.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment and defines
the private-sector competitive equilibrium. Section 3 defines the Markov-perfect equilibrium. We
characterize the solution to the government’s problem and solve the equilibrium. Section 4 describes
the parametrization strategy. We conduct equilibrium analysis in Section 5 by presenting the Markov
government’s policy rules and discussing their implications for the labor market. Section 6 provides
quantitative analysis of UI benefit extensions during recessions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the model environment and characterize the competitive equilibrium.
The model is based on a search-matching framework with aggregate productivity shocks.
2.1 Model environment
Time is discrete and infinite. The model is inhabited by a mass of infinitely lived workers and firms.
The measure of workers is normalized to one. In any given period, a worker can be either employed
or unemployed. Some unemployed workers receive UI benefits. Workers are risk averse and maximize
expected lifetime utility given by
E0
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡 [𝑈(𝑐𝑡)− 𝑣(𝑠𝑡)]
where E0 is the period 0 expectation factor, and 𝛽 is the time discount factor. Period utility comprises
of utility from consumption of goods 𝑈(𝑐) and disutility from job search activity 𝑣(𝑠). Utility is
increasing in 𝑐 and decreasing in 𝑠. To study the insurance incentive of the government we assume
that 𝑈(·) is a concave function. Only unemployed workers choose positive search intensity; that is,
there is no on-the-job search. Each period, an employed worker gets paid wages from production.
Wage determination technology is specified later in this section. An unemployed worker, if on
unemployment benefits, receives 𝑏 from the government. In addition, an unemployed worker also
produces ℎ, which we take as the combined value of leisure and home production. There are no
private insurance markets and workers cannot save or borrow.
Firms are risk neutral and maximize the expected discounted sum of profits, with the same
discount factor 𝛽. A firm can be either matched to a worker (and producing) or vacant. A vacant
4 Mitman and Rabinovich (2016) estimate a government’s policy response function using historical extensions and
unemployment data. Similar to our approach, they allow the private sector to form expectations about future policies.
The difference is the expectations are based on the exogenous policy rules instead of endogenously chosen policy like
in our case.
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firm posting a vacancy incurs a flow cost 𝜅.
Unemployed workers and vacancies form new matches. Let 𝐼 and 𝑉 denote the aggregate search
by unemployed workers and the aggregate vacancy posting by firms, respectively. Then the number of
new matches formed in a period is given by the matching function 𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ). The matching function
exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments,
and is bounded above by the number of expected matches: 𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ) ≤min{𝐼,𝑉 }. The job-finding
probability per efficiency unit of search intensity, 𝑓 , and the job-filling probability per vacancy, 𝑞,
are functions of labor market tightness, 𝜃 = 𝑉 /𝐼. More specifically,
𝑓(𝜃) =
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 )
𝐼
=𝑀(1,𝜃)
𝑞(𝜃) =
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 )
𝑉
=𝑀
(︂1
𝜃
,1
)︂
.
Following the assumptions made on 𝑀 , 𝑓(𝜃) is increasing in 𝜃 and 𝑞(𝜃) is decreasing in 𝜃. The job-
finding probability for an unemployed worker searching with intensity 𝑠 is 𝑠𝑓(𝜃). Existing matches
are destroyed exogenously with job separation probability 𝛿.
Each period, a matched pair of a worker and a firm produces 𝑧, where 𝑧 is the aggregate labor
productivity. 𝑧 is equal to 𝑧 at the steady state.
2.2 Government policy
The government cannot borrow or save; instead, it balances the budget each period. The government
finances unemployment benefits 𝑏 through a lump sum tax, 𝜏 , on all workers, both employed and
unemployed. The government budget constraint is
𝜏 = 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏. (1)
The government decides the generosity of the UI program by varying (1) benefit level, 𝑏≥ 0, and
(2) the benefit exhaustion probability 𝑑 (1/𝑑 is the maximum expected benefit duration). Once the
benefit level and exhaustion probability are determined, benefit-eligible unemployed workers receive
benefits 𝑏 with probability 1− 𝑑. Government policies are taken as exogenous in a decentralized
competitive equilibrium but are chosen endogenously in the government’s problem.
Two things are worth noting about the exhaustion probability. First, using a probability instead of
introducing individual history dependency means an unemployed worker could receive UI benefits for
more or less than the maximum expected benefit duration (1/𝑑). But this setup allows for tractability
by using the proportion of benefit-eligible workers to proxy parsimoniously for the duration that a
worker stays on UI.5
5 Similar ways of modeling are used in the monetary policy (“Calvo fairy”) and in the sovereign debt literature
(modeling long duration debt).
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(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1)
𝑡 policy (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 )
benefit-collecting:
𝑢1(1− 𝑑)
production
consumption
search, vacancy posting
separation → 𝑢1′
𝑢′,𝑢1′
𝑧′
𝑡+ 1
Figure 1: Timing of events.
Second, as noted in the introduction, a key assumption about exhaustion probability is that the
government can commit to excluding benefit-ineligible unemployed workers from receiving benefits:
once an unemployed worker loses benefit eligibility, he has to find work first before becoming eligible
for benefits again. The assumption is consistent with how UI policy normally works.6
2.3 Timing
The timing of events within a period is illustrated in Figure 1 and is as follows. The economy enters
period 𝑡 with a measure of the total unemployed workers 𝑢 and a measure of the benefit-eligible
unemployed workers 𝑢1. The aggregate shock 𝑧 then realizes. (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) are the aggregate states of
the economy.
Once government policies (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ) for the period are announced, 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢1(1 − 𝑑) workers
collect benefit. In other words, with probability 𝑑, benefit-eligible unemployed workers lose benefit
status in this period.
Employed workers produce 𝑧 and receive wages 𝑤. Unemployed workers produce ℎ and, if col-
lecting benefits, receive 𝑏. All workers pay a lump sum tax 𝜏 .
Given aggregate states and government policies for the period, unemployed workers with and
without benefits choose search intensity 𝑠1 and 𝑠0, respectively. At the same time, firms decide how
many vacancies to post, at cost 𝜅 per vacancy. The aggregate search is then 𝐼 = 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)𝑠1 + (𝑢−
𝑢1(1− 𝑑))𝑠0, aggregate vacancy posting is 𝑉 , and market tightness is equal to 𝜃= 𝑉 /𝐼. The fraction
of unemployed workers with and without benefits who find jobs is 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1 and 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0, respectively.
At the same time, a fraction 𝛿 of the existing 1 − 𝑢 matches are exogenously destroyed. Newly
unemployed workers and unemployed workers with benefits constitute next period’s state 𝑢1.7
6 But during the most recent recession and especially during 2008-2009, many unemployed workers who had pre-
viously exhausted their benefits became eligible for new tiers of extensions. In other words, during this period the
government does not have commitment to not bring ineligible unemployed workers back into the eligible pool. We
interpret this non-commitment as coming from convenience instead of optimality concerns: the government did not
optimally choose to let these unemployed workers’ benefits expire and then give them more tiers of extension. As such,
our original assumption about the exhaustion probability is an abstraction of what happened during this period.
7 Effectively, newly unemployed workers receive benefits with next period probability 1− 𝑑, the same probability
an unemployed worker with benefits today keeps collecting tomorrow. In reality, newly unemployed workers qualify
for benefits with at least two quarters of earnings and must pass an “earnings test” that depends on individual state
policies. We model it as a probability for simplicity here.
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The laws of motion of unemployed workers are
total unemployment: 𝑢′ = 𝛿(1− 𝑢)⏟  ⏞  
newly unemployed
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)(𝑢− 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)⏟  ⏞  
previously unemployed who didn’t find job
(2)
benefit-eligible unemployed: 𝑢1
′
= 𝛿(1− 𝑢)⏟  ⏞  
newly unemployed
+ (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)⏟  ⏞  
unemployed with benefits who didn’t find job
(3)
2.4 Workers
Denote by 𝑔 the government policy (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ). In what follows we suppress the functional arguments in
𝜃, which is an object determined in equilibrium. Wage 𝑤 depends on the states of the economy, and
may be an equilibrium object. The wage determination process is specified later. An unemployed
worker with benefits consumes ℎ + 𝑏− 𝜏 and chooses search intensity 𝑠1; an unemployed worker
without benefits consumes ℎ − 𝜏 and chooses search intensity 𝑠0. With probability 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠, 𝑠 =
{𝑠0,𝑠1}, he finds a job and starts working the following period. Let 𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), 𝑉 1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and
𝑉 0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) be the value of an employed worker, an unemployed worker with and without benefits,
respectively, given the aggregate states and government policy for the period.
The optimization problem of an unemployed worker without benefits (superscript 0 denotes no
benefits) is
𝑉 0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = max
𝑠0
𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠0) + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝛽E𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′), (4)
and the problem of an unemployed worker with benefits is
𝑉 1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = max
𝑠1
𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠1) + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝛽E
[︁
𝑑′𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
]︁
, (5)
where if still unemployed next period, then with probability 𝑑′ he loses benefits.
A worker entering a period employed produces and consumes his wage 𝑤 minus tax 𝜏 . With
probability 𝛿, he loses his job and becomes unemployed the following period. There is no intra-
temporal search, so a newly separated worker remains unemployed for at least one period. The
Bellman equation of an employed worker is then
𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 𝑈(𝑤− 𝜏 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+𝛿𝛽E
[︁
𝑑′𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑑)′𝑉 1(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
]︁
, (6)
where if separated from his current job, then with probability 1− 𝑑′ he has benefits the next period.
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2.5 Firms
An unmatched firm posts a vacancy to be matched with a worker and start production.8 A firm
that posts a vacancy incurs a flow cost 𝜅. With probability 𝑞(𝜃), a vacancy is filled and ready for
production the following period. Let 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and 𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) be the value of an unmatched
and a matched firm, respectively. The Bellman equation of an unmatched firm is
𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = −𝜅+ 𝑞(𝜃)𝛽E𝐽𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑞(𝜃))𝛽E𝐽𝑢(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′), (7)
In the equilibrium and under free-entry condition, the firm will post vacancies 𝑣(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) until
𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 0.
A matched firm receives output net of wages 𝑧 − 𝑤. With constant probability 𝛿, a match is
destroyed at the end of the period and the firm becomes vacant. The Bellman equation of a matched
firm is
𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 𝑧 −𝑤+ (1− 𝛿)𝛽E𝐽𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + 𝛿𝛽E𝐽𝑢(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′). (8)
2.6 Wage determination
When a match is formed, the economic rent is shared between the firm and the worker. It is well
known that to generate realistic cyclical movements in search and matching models wage rigidity is
needed. There are many ways to do this in the literature (e.g. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Hall
and Milgrom (2008)). To introduce wage rigidity, we set wages to be a function of productivity. In
particular, wages increase in labor productivity 𝑧 but less than one to one. This way, workers and
firms share the risk of fluctuating aggregate labor productivity.
While Nash bargaining is widely used in the search and matching framework, other wage de-
termination specifications have been used in the literature. Works in the UI literature have used
alternate specifications to introduce wage rigidity: Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) and Naka-
jima (2012) use specifications similar to the one we use. The main advantage of our specification is
it allows us to calibrate the degree of wage rigidity directly from the data. The main drawback is
because wages do not depend on workers’ outside options, benefit policies have no effect on wages,
which is the macro channel emphasized in Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013).9
Nevertheless, we choose this exogenous wage specification as the benchmark because the govern-
ment’s non-commitment optimal problem is complicated enough without introducing endogenous
wage settings. Using an exogenous wage setting, we can more easily illustrate the non-commitment
mechanism which is the highlight of this paper.10
8 The firms can be viewed as a representative firm with a collection of jobs and several vacancies.
9 More recently, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2017) find small macro effects of UI extensions.
10 In the online appendix we present some partial quantitative results using Nash bargaining, which illustrate inter-
actions between wage and UI policy.
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2.7 Competitive equilibrium
Definition 1. (Competitive equilibrium) Given a policy 𝑔= (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ) and initial conditions (𝑧−,𝑢−,𝑢1−),
a competitive equilibrium consists of (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1)–measurable functions for worker’s search intensities
𝑠0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and 𝑠1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), market tightness 𝜃(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), total unemployment 𝑢′(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and
the measure of benefit-eligible unemployed workers 𝑢1′(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), and value functions 𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔),
𝑉 0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), 𝑉 1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), 𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), and 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), such that for all (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔):
• the value functions satisfy the worker’s and firm’s Bellman equations (4)-(8);
• the search intensities 𝑠0 and 𝑠1 solve the unemployed worker’s maximization problems of (4)
and (5), respectively;
• the market tightness 𝜃 is consistent with the free-entry condition, 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 0;
• the measures of unemployment satisfy the laws of motion (2)-(3).
2.8 Characterization of private-sector optimality
The competitive equilibrium can be characterized by three optimality conditions.11 The online
appendix contains a derivation of the optimality conditions. In what follows, primes denote variables
of the following period, and subscripts denote derivatives.
Worker’s Search Incentive The optimal choice of search intensity 𝑠0 and 𝑠1 for the unemployed
worker is characterized by
no benefit: 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽E
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′ )𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
(9)
with benefit: 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽E𝑑′
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′ )𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
+𝛽E(1− 𝑑′)
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏′ − 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠1′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠1′ − 𝛿)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
. (10)
The worker’s optimality conditions state that the marginal cost (left-hand side) of increasing the
job-finding probability equals the marginal gain (right-hand side). The marginal cost is the marginal
disutility from search weighted by the aggregate job-finding rate per efficiency unit of search. The
marginal gain is the sum of the utility gain from being employed the next period and the benefit of
economizing on future search cost. We can make two useful observations.
Proposition 1. Unemployed workers with benefits search less than those without benefits, 𝑠1 < 𝑠0,
given 𝑣𝑠(𝑠) > 0 and 𝑣𝑠𝑠(𝑠) > 0, and 0<E𝑑′ < 1.
For the unemployed worker with benefits (equation 10), his marginal gain from search is a
weighted sum of the gains if he loses benefit eligibility (first line) and if he stays benefit eligible
11 To economize on notation, we suppress the dependence on (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔). It should be understood throughout that
the equilibrium allocations are functions with arguments (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔).
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next period (second line). The first part is identical to the marginal gain for the unemployed worker
without benefits (equation 9) and is larger than the second part. So the marginal gain from search
and thus the search incentive is smaller for the unemployed worker with benefits as long as the
expected future exhaustion probability 𝑑′ is bounded away from 1. Given an increasing marginal
search cost function, it then implies that the unemployed worker with benefits search less. In other
words, a non-zero expected probability of receiving benefits tomorrow (E(1− 𝑑′)) creates a moral
hazard problem today for the unemployed worker with benefits.
Proposition 2. A lower expected future benefit exhaustion probability 𝑑′ or a higher future benefit
𝑏′ reduces the search incentive for the unemployed workers with benefits.
Because the first part of the marginal gain from search (equation 10) is larger than the second
part, the total marginal gain and hence the search incentive is lower when the expected future benefit
exhaustion probability is lower. At the same time, the second part is decreasing in the future benefit,
so the search incentive is lower when the future benefit is expected to be higher.
Firm’s Job Posting Incentive From firm’s free-entry condition
𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
= 𝛽E
[︂
𝑧′ −𝑤′ + (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃′)
]︂
, (11)
where the marginal cost (left-hand side) equals the marginal gain (right-hand side) of a filled vacancy.
The marginal cost is the flow cost of posting a vacancy weighted by the probability of filling that
vacancy. The marginal gain is the profits from a filled vacancy. Because a newly formed match does
not become operational until the next period, the gain from production only has components from
the next period. The current productivity level 𝑧 therefore does not have a direct impact on the
firm’s current hiring decision. Instead, due to persistence in the productivity process it affects the
firm’s expectation of future productivity and hence its current hiring decision.
3 Markov Equilibrium
In this section, we define the Markov-perfect equilibrium in our economy. We assume the government
is a utilitarian planner who maximizes the expected value of a worker’s utility. The government policy
instruments include benefit level 𝑏, expected duration 1/𝑑, and lump-sum tax 𝜏 . We do not pose
assumptions on the government’s ability to commit to future policies, and we consider government
policies that are time consistent using the Markov-perfect equilibrium, à la Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-
Rull (2008).
Intuitively, one can think of the economy as having a different government each period. Each
successive government chooses only the current policy, taking all future governments’ policies as
given. In other words, today’s government cannot directly choose future policies. Instead, both
today’s government and the private sector form expectations about future government policy rules.
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Like Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), we focus on equilibria where government policy depends
differentiably on the aggregate states of the economy.12
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Because each worker and firm is infinitely small,
they take future government policies as given.13 The equilibrium described above can be equivalently
stated as an equilibrium where the government chooses policy and private-sector allocations together
given the states of the economy. To reduce the number of policy instruments in the government’s
problem, we use the following function derived from the government’s budget constraint to express
tax
𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑) := 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)𝑏.
The government period welfare function is equal to the average welfare of all workers, and is given
by
𝑅(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1) = (1− 𝑢)𝑈(𝑤(𝑧)−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑)) worker
+(𝑢− 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)) [︀𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑))− 𝑣(𝑠0)]︀ unemployed without benefit
+𝑢1(1− 𝑑) [︀𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑))− 𝑣(𝑠1)]︀ unemployed with benefit
Definition 2. (Markov-perfect equilibrium) A Markov-perfect equilibrium consists of a govern-
ment’s value function𝐺, government policy rules Ψ𝑏 and Ψ𝑑, and private decision rules
{︀
𝑆0,𝑆1,Θ,Γ,Γ1
}︀
such that for all aggregate states (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑏 = Ψ𝑏(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑑 = Ψ𝑑(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑠0 = 𝑆0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑠1 =
𝑆1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝜃 = Θ(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑢′ = Γ(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), and 𝑢1′ = Γ1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) solve
max
𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1𝜃,𝑢′,𝑢1′
𝑅(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1) + 𝛽E𝐺(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′)
subject to
• The worker’s laws of motion
𝑓1(𝑢,𝑢1,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1,𝜃,𝑢′) := 𝑢′ − 𝛿(1− 𝑢)− 𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)− (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝑢= 0 (12)
𝑓2(𝑢,𝑢1,𝑑,𝑠1,𝜃,𝑢1
′
) := 𝑢1
′ − 𝛿(1− 𝑢)− (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑) = 0; (13)
• The private-sector optimality conditions below, writing 𝒪= (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) to economize on notation
12 While there is no proof for the existence and uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium, Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2014) provide argument for the existence of Markov-perfect equilibrium with continuous decision rules; and Pei and
Xie (2015) use numerical method to provide evidence for a unique differentiable equilibrium in a simpler setup.
13 The current government policies are decided before the private sector moves. The future government policies
depend on future states, which are affected by how the private sector moves today. In our setup, workers and firms do
not take into account how their action will affect future policies through changing future states.
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𝜂1(𝑠
0,𝜃,𝒪′;Ψ𝑏,Ψ𝑑,𝑆0,𝑆1,Θ)
:=
𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛽E
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆0(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽E
[︂
(1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆0(𝒪′))𝑣𝑠(𝑆
0(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) − 𝛿
𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
= 0 (14)
𝜂2(𝑠
1,𝜃,𝒪′;Ψ𝑏,Ψ𝑑,𝑆0,𝑆1,Θ)
:=
𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛽EΨ𝑑(𝒪′)
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝐼 ′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆0(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽EΨ𝑑(𝒪′)
[︂
(1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆0(𝒪′))𝑣𝑠(𝑆
0(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) − 𝛿
𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
−𝛽E(1−Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ+Ψ𝑏(𝒪′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆1(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽E(1−Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))[1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆1(𝒪′)− 𝛿]𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) = 0 (15)
𝜂3(𝜃,𝒪′;Θ) := 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
− 𝛽E
[︂
𝑧′ −𝑤(𝑧′) + (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
= 0; (16)
• The government value function satisfies the functional equation
𝐺(𝒪) ≡ 𝑅(𝒪,Ψ𝑏(𝒪),Ψ𝑑(𝒪),𝑆0(𝒪),𝑆1(𝒪)) + 𝛽E𝐺(𝑧′,Γ(𝒪),Γ1(𝒪)).
The government chooses current policy to maximize current and expected future welfare, knowing
how the private sector will behave given the policy. More specifically, the current government weighs
the trade-off between the current and future welfare. By choosing a longer expected duration 1/𝑑, the
current government increases the share of unemployed workers receiving benefits today, thus raising
the current welfare. At the same time, because of moral hazard problem, unemployed workers on
benefits choose a lower search intensity, and as a result higher duration reduces the average search
intensity, leading to higher future unemployment and lower future welfare.14
In the equilibrium, all successive governments follow the same set of policy rules. The current gov-
ernment, by choosing the current policy, affects the policies of future governments through changing
the future states of the economy. This disciplining effect, through the private-sector’s expectations
of future policies, affects the job search of unemployed workers with benefits today, and through gen-
eral equilibrium effects, affects the job search of unemployed worker without benefits. The current
government correctly anticipates this effect when choosing today’s policy. Proposition 3 provides
the conditions that characterize the government’s optimal decisions. The proof involves deriving the
Generalized Euler Equation (GEE) and is included in the online appendix.
Proposition 3. Given the aggregate states of the economy and the private-sector optimality con-
14 A secondary effect exists through taxation. With longer duration, more unemployed workers receive benefits and
the lump-sum tax is higher. The size of this effect is small relative to the other two effects.
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ditions, the unemployment benefit policy 𝑏 in the Markov-perfect equilibrium is characterized by15
𝑅𝑏 = 0, (17)
and policy 𝑑 associated with the expected benefit duration can be characterized by the GEE
0 = 𝑅𝑑 − 𝑓1𝑑𝜆
+
𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
{︃
𝜂1𝑢1′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢1′
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂
+ . . .
· · ·+ 𝜂3𝑢1′
𝜂3𝜃
[︁
−𝜆𝑓1𝜃 − 𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)− 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
(𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0)−
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
(︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
)︂]︁}︃
+𝛽E
(︂
− 𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑢1 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢1
]︀
+𝛽E
(︂
− 𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
)︂(︂
−𝑓
′
2𝑢1
𝑓 ′2𝑑
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀
, (18)
where 𝜆 is the shadow price of unemployment characterized by
0 = 𝜆
+
{︃
𝜂1𝑢′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢′
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂
+ . . .
· · ·+ 𝜂3𝑢′
𝜂3𝜃
[︁
−𝜆𝑓1𝜃 − 𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)− 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
(𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0)−
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
(︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
)︂]︁}︃
−𝛽E[︀𝑅′𝑒 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑒]︀
−𝛽E
(︂
−𝑓
′
2𝑢
𝑓 ′2𝑑
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀
. (19)
Benefit level 𝑏 affects only the current welfare and does not have an effect on the future states
of economy and so it does not affect future policies.16 As a result, 𝑏 is set at a level that equates
the current marginal gain (higher consumption for unemployed workers with benefits) and marginal
cost (higher lump-sum tax). The equation 𝑅𝑏 = 0 captures these incentives.
Interpretation of the GEE In contrast, because 𝑑 affects future states (𝑢′,𝑢1′), its choice is more
complex. Here we give a heuristic interpretation of the different effects based on the GEE (Equation
18). Section 5.2 provides a comparative static analysis of the government’s different incentives. From
(18), a change in 𝑑 has four effects, holding policy 𝑏 unchanged. First, it directly affects the trade-off
between current consumption and future unemployment (first line). In particular, a lower 𝑑 (higher
expected duration) increases the current welfare by increasing the share of unemployed workers
receiving benefits. This is the insurance effect. At the same time, a lower 𝑑 also reduces average
15 Subscripts denote partial derivatives, for example, 𝑓1𝑑 = 𝜕𝑓1/𝜕𝑑.
16 While the current benefit level does not affect search behavior, higher expected future benefit levels reduce the
current search incentive of an unemployed worker with benefits.
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search, thus increasing the future unemployment.17 Second, through changing the expectation of
future benefit duration it affects the current job search of the unemployed workers with benefits.
This is the moral hazard effect. Changes in the search intensity of these unemployed workers in
turn affect the average job search and vacancy posting through general equilibrium effects (second
and third lines). Third, any change in 𝑑 affects future consumption through changing the future
unemployment (fourth line). This and the second effect together represent the “search/leisure”
trade-off: a lower 𝑑 reduces today’s job search but increases future unemployment. Lastly, through
changing 𝑑′, any change in 𝑑 changes the future trade-off between consumption and unemployment
(last line). The weight on the last line can be thought of as 𝑑𝑑′/𝑑𝑑 holding the two flow equations at
zero and unemployment after the next period unchanged. The government determines the current 𝑑
by setting the sum of the four marginal effects of 𝑑 to zero.
Note that the choice of 𝑑 changes the average search because unemployed workers with and
without benefits search differently (Proposition 1). It does not have a direct moral hazard effect on
the individual’s search decision; instead, through its effects on the expected future policies (𝑑′,𝑏′),
it creates a moral hazard effect on the search of unemployed workers with benefits (Proposition 2).
This absence of a direct moral hazard effect is inherent in the timing of the model, that is, policy
takes effect at the beginning of each period and consumption and production take place before job
creation.18
The Markov-perfect equilibrium is then characterized by a system of functional equations (12)–
(16), and (17)–(19). An analytical characterization of the Markov-perfect equilibrium is not possible;
instead, we solve for the equilibrium numerically by approximating the government policy rules and
the private-sector decision rules using the Chebyshev collocation method.19
4 Parametrization
We describe our calibration strategy in this section. The model period is one month. We calibrate
the parameters by matching the steady state moments of the Markov equilibrium to the long-run
empirical moments of the U.S. labor market between 2003.I and 2007.IV. We do this under the
assumption that the government behaves as a benevolent utilitarian welfare-maximizer without com-
mitment to future policies and the equilibrium economy with such a government mirrors the U.S.
economy. We then evaluate untargeted model moments and model-generated policy paths during
recession (in Section 6) to validate this model assumption.20
17𝑓1𝑑 = 𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠
0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1 is the marginal change in unemployment when 𝑑 changes.
18 Chetty (2008), Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010), Nakajima (2012) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2016) among
others adopt the timing of consumption before job creation in their analyses. Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) use a
different timing whereby job creation takes place before consumption and production.
19 The GEE contains derivatives of policy rules, which make solving the Markov equilibrium different from solving
a standard growth model or the optimal policy problem of a government with commitment.
20 We calibrate to the Markov equilibrium here. An alternative is to calibrate to the competitive equilibrium of
the model economy imposing an exogenous UI policy rule which mimics the UI policy in the U.S. over the last 50
years—similar to Mitman and Rabinovich (2016)— and then solve the Markov equilibrium using these calibrated
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The utility function is
𝑈(𝑐,𝑠) = 𝑐
1−𝜎
1− 𝜎 − 𝑣(𝑠),
where 𝑣(·) is the search cost function. We assume 𝑣(·) is a non-negative, strictly increasing, and
convex function, with the property that 𝑣(0) is bounded and 𝑣(0) ≥ 0. We specify the search cost
function to be consistent with the literature:
𝑣(𝑠) = 𝛼
𝑠1+𝜑
1+ 𝜑 .
For any 𝛼 > 0, 𝑣 exhibits positive and increasing marginal cost, 𝑣𝑠(𝑠) > 0 and 𝑣𝑠𝑠(𝑠) > 0, and
𝑣(0) = 𝑣𝑠(0) = 0.
We adopt the matching function from Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), which is also used
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) among others,
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ) = 𝑉
[1+ (𝑉 /𝐼)𝜒]1/𝜒
,
where 𝐼 is the aggregate job search and 𝑉 is the aggregate vacancy posting in the economy. This
matching function guarantees that both the job-finding rate,
𝑓(𝜃) =
𝜃
[1+ 𝜃𝜒]1/𝜒
,
and the job-filling rate,
𝑞(𝜃) =
1
[1+ 𝜃𝜒]1/𝜒
,
are always strictly less than 1.
We pick three parameters related to preferences. The discount factor 𝛽 is set at 0.991/3, giving
a quarterly discount factor of 0.99. The coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎 is set to 1 (log utility).
Finally, the search cost curvature parameter 𝜑 is set to 1 following the average estimate in the
literature.21
The externally calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1. Following the methodology
outlined in Shimer (2005), we calculate the average monthly job separation rate from the aggregate-
level CPS data.22 This gives an average job-finding rate during 2003.I-2007.IV of 0.40, and an
average separation rate 𝛿 = 0.02.23 We set the costs of vacancy creation 𝜅 to be 58% of monthly
parameters.
21 Imposing 𝜑 equal to 1 gives a quadratic search cost function. This restriction is consistent with estimates by
Yashiv (2000), Christensen et al. (2005), and Lise (2013), and calibration work of Nakajima (2012).
22 To be consistent with our model, we do not adjust for time aggregation error when computing the job separation
rate. Therefore, the job separation rate from the data is 𝛿𝑡 = 𝑢𝑠𝑡+1/𝑒𝑡, where 𝑢𝑠 is the short-term (one to four weeks)
unemployment, and 𝑒 is the total employment.
23 Although some may argue that the U.S. economy during 2003.I-2007.IV is above the long-run trend, we believe
it is an appropriate period to target for the labor market, especially because of the secular downward trend in job
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Table 1: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
𝛿 U.S. job separation rate 0.02
𝜅 Vacancy posting cost 0.58
𝜌 Persistence of productivity 0.968
𝜎𝜖 Standard deviation of innovation to productivity 0.0060
𝜖𝑤 Elasticity of wage with respect to productivity 0.446
Note: Calibration targets are monthly statistics of the U.S. economy.
labor productivity following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
As in Shimer (2005), labor productivity 𝑧 is taken to be the average real output per employed
person in the non-farm business sector. This measure is taken from the seasonally adjusted quarterly
data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We normalize the mean productivity to be 𝑧 = 1,
and assume an AR(1) process for the shock to 𝑧:
log𝑧′ = 𝜌 log𝑧 + 𝜎𝜖𝜖,
where 𝜌 ∈ [0,1), 𝜎𝜖 > 0, and 𝜖 are i.i.d. standard normal random variables. We target a quar-
terly autocorrelation of 0.762 and an unconditional standard deviation of 0.013 for the HP-filtered
productivity process. At a monthly frequency this means setting 𝜌= 0.9680 and 𝜎𝜖 = 0.006.
Wages are determined by the following function of productivity,
𝑤(𝑧) = exp(log ?¯?+ 𝜖𝑤 log𝑧),
where ?¯? represents the steady-state share of output for the worker, and 𝜖𝑤 is the elasticity of the
average wage with respect to aggregate productivity. We use the data on labor productivity and real
wages (constructed using labor shares data) between 1951.I and 2014.IV to estimate 𝜖𝑤 = 0.446. This
means a 1 percentage point increase in labor productivity is associated with a 0.446 percentage point
increase in real wages. Our estimate is close to the estimate of 0.449 for 1951.I-2004.IV obtained by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
We jointly calibrate four parameters using steady-state moments. The four parameters are (1)
the value of nonmarket activity ℎ, (2) the matching function parameter 𝜒, (3) the level parameter of
search cost 𝛼, and (4) the steady-state wage level ?¯?. We use four steady-state moments as targets:
(1) the expected UI replacement ratio,24 (2) the average job-finding rate, (3) the average job-filling
separation rate documented by, for example, Fujita (2012). The online appendix also documents a declining trend in
job-finding rate since 1951. Given these trends, using the average job-finding and separation rates over a longer horizon
would overestimate the recent steady-state numbers.
24 Unlike Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the benefit level in our model is endogenously chosen
by the government and is a function of nonmarket activity in the steady state. This is why we can target replacement
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Table 2: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
ℎ Value of nonmarket activity 0.595
𝛼 Disutility of search 1.706
𝜒 Matching parameter 3.462
?¯? Steady-state wage 0.979
Target Data Model
Average replacement ratio 40% 38.1%
Average job-finding rate 0.40 0.416
% unemployed with benefits 45 45.8
Average job-filling rate 0.66 0.661
Note: Calibration targets are monthly statistics of the U.S. economy 2005.I-2007.IV.
rate, and (4) the proportion of unemployed workers with benefits.25 We follow Shimer (2005) and set
the replacement ratio at 40%. The average job-finding rate is the monthly rate at which unemployed
workers become employed, and it is 0.40 for 2003.I-2007.IV. Over the same period, the job-filling
rate is 0.66.26 Table 2 reports these internally calibrated parameter and the matching of calibration
targets. The calibrated model delivers a benefit duration of 26.3 weeks (untargeted), very close to
the benefit duration of 26 weeks in the U.S. during normal times, thus delivering the first model
validation.
Table 3 compares key labor market statistics in the pre-2008 U.S. economy and the calibrated
Markov economy.27 The calibrated model does a good job of generating the relevant cyclical prop-
erties, which provides the second model validation. The model also produces a negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancy, thus preserving the shape of the Beveridge-curve (inverse re-
lation between unemployment and vacancy). Two parameters are critical to generating the cyclical
properties. First, we calibrate the elasticity of wage with respect to productivity to match data
counterparts. The relatively low wage elasticity means firm’s profit and hence vacancy posting are
volatile over the business cycle. Second, in the equilibrium, unemployed workers expect higher bene-
fit durations when the productivity is low, which lowers search even more and leads to larger cyclical
responses in search and hence unemployment.
ratio to pin down the value of nonmarket activity.
25 We use a derivative-free algorithm for least-squares minimization to perform joint calibration. See Zhang, Conn,
and Scheinberg (2010) for details.
26 The job-filling rate is calculated as the job-finding rate divided by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, where the
latter is computed using the national unemployment rate reported by the BLS and the nonfarm job openings from the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. The estimate for the 2003.I-2007.IV period is close to Den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) who use plant-level data during 1972.II–1988.IV and get a job-filling rate of 0.71.
27 Here we use the long-run average job separation rate in the model to see if the model can generate the second-
moments in the data. In Section 6, we focus on the period of 2008-2013 and use the realized path of job separation
rates to generate period-to-period movements.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Cyclicality
Productivity Unemployment Vacancy v-u ratio
Statistic 𝑧 𝑢 𝑣 𝑣/𝑢
Quarterly U.S. data 1951.I-2007.IV
Standard deviation 0.013 0.123 0.142 0.257
Correlation matrix
𝑧 1 -0.271 0.392 0.339
𝑢 - 1 -0.889 -0.951
𝑣 - - 1 0.980
𝑣/𝑢 - - - 1
Calibrated Markov economy
Standard deviation 0.013 0.147 0.167 0.273
Correlation matrix
𝑧 1 -0.908 0.919 0.982
𝑢 - 1 -0.698 -0.909
𝑣 - - 1 0.933
𝑣/𝑢 - - - 1
Note: Seasonally adjusted unemployment series, 𝑢, is constructed by the BLS from the CPS. Vacancy-posting, 𝑣, is
Barnichon (2010)’s spliced series of seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index constructed by the Conference
Board and the job-posting data from the JOLTS. Both 𝑢 and 𝑣 are quarterly averages of monthly series. All variables
are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1,600.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present the Markov government policy rules and discuss their effects on the
equilibrium labor market.
5.1 Markov equilibrium policy rules
Figure 2 plots the Markov equilibrium UI policy rules holding productivity at the steady state level.28
In each plot, the solid line represents the policy rule, and the dashed line marks the steady-state
unemployment.
The expected UI duration 1/𝑑 increases in the total unemployment. The government’s decision
on the UI duration involves a trade-off between insurance (for higher current consumption) and
job-creation (for higher future welfare). When the unemployment is high, both the insurance and
the job-creation incentives are high—the former because as more people are unemployed a longer
duration gives more unemployed workers benefits, and the latter because a shorter duration increases
the job-search incentives for more people. In the equilibrium, the increase in the insurance incen-
tive outweighs the higher job creation incentive, and the expected duration increases in the total
28 We also hold the proportion of unemployed workers with benefits at the steady-state level.
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Markov policy ∙ Markov steady state
Figure 2: Markov equilibrium government policy rules holding productivity and proportion of benefit-eligible
unemployed workers at steady state.
unemployment.
In contrast, the UI benefit level 𝑏 is lower at higher unemployment, but the size of variations is
minuscule, falling by less than 1% from the steady state level when the unemployment is at 10%.
Intuitively, when the unemployment increases, the rise in the cost of taxation is almost entirely offset
by the higher gain from insurance.
Figure 3 plots the Markov equilibrium UI policy rules, holding the unemployment (both total
unemployment and benefit-eligible unemployment) at the steady-state levels. The expected benefit
duration increases drastically with a lower labor productivity, especially when the productivity is
below its steady state level. This is because when the productivity is low, the expected productivity
next period is also low, assuming a persistent productivity process. As such, the marginal return
from production tomorrow (for both workers and firm) is low, as is the cost of a low level of job
creation today (or equivalently a high unemployment tomorrow). As a result, the marginal cost
of a longer duration (lower job creation) is low, and the government chooses a long duration. The
unemployment benefit level 𝑏, in contrast, increases with a higher labor productivity, but the slope
is fairly small.
Overall, the plots show that the Markov equilibrium benefit duration is countercyclical, higher
when the unemployment is higher or when the productivity is lower, whereas the benefit level is
almost acyclical (slightly procyclical). These properties are broadly consistent with the U.S. policies
during recessions. In Section 6 we quantitatively evaluate how close the policies are to reality.
Before that, we use comparative static and impulse response analyses to provide some intuition for
the equilibrium results.
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Markov policy ∙ Markov steady state
Figure 3: Markov equilibrium government policy rules holding unemployment at steady state.
5.2 Comparative static analysis of government incentives
Because the government’s choice of 𝑑 (which directly translates into expected duration) involves
the trade-off between insurance and moral hazard, we conduct a comparative static analysis to
understand the changes in these two incentives that drive the movements in the benefit duration.
Figure 4 shows the responses of these two incentives to changes in unemployment (left panel) and
productivity (right panel).29 The two incentives are equalized at the steady state (dotted vertical
line). Off steady state, when the marginal gain (solid blue line) is higher than the marginal cost
(dashed red line) the government has an incentive to increase the benefit duration.
As the total unemployment rises, both the insurance gains and the moral hazard cost are higher.
The marginal insurance gain is mainly captured by 𝑅𝑑 in the GEE (Equation 18)
−
extensive margin⏞ ⏟ 
𝑢1 ×
intensive margin⏞  ⏟  [︁
𝑈 (ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠1)−
(︁
𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠0)
)︁]︁
⏟  ⏞  
welfare gain from giving benefits to an additional worker
(20)
With a higher unemployment (𝑢) (and fixing the proportion of benefit-eligible unemployed workers),
𝑢1 in (20) is larger, which increases the marginal welfare gain from a smaller 𝑑 (longer duration).
At the same time, the larger moral hazard cost comes from the fact that a higher unemployment
makes the future unemployment more sensitive to changes in search. The left panel of Figure 4 shows
that a 1% increase in the total unemployment (from the dotted vertical line to the dashed vertical
29 The responses over unemployment hold the proportion of benefit-eligible unemployed workers and productivity at
steady state levels. The responses over productivity hold total and benefit-eligible unemployment at steady states.
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Responses to a 1pp increase in unemployment Responses to a 1% drop in productivity
Marginal gain from insurance ∙ Marginal cost of moral hazard Steady state
∙ 1% increase in unemployment (or drop in productivity)
Figure 4: Responses of marginal gain from insurance and marginal moral hazard cost to a 1 percentage-point
increase in unemployment or 1% drop in productivity, holding government policies at the steady state.
line) raises the insurance incentive by 16% and moral hazard cost by 9%. The higher increment in
the insurance incentive means that at a higher unemployment level the government has a stronger
incentive to increase the UI duration.
In response to a drop in productivity, both the insurance gains and the moral hazard cost are
lower. In particular, a lower productivity leads to lower wages, which increases the employed workers’
marginal utility of consumption and reduces the marginal gain from insurance. This effect is small,
and disappears if the worker is risk neutral. In contrast, the drop in moral hazard cost is large.
At a lower productivity level, the expected future productivity and wages are also lower, which
means that an increase in the future unemployment leads to a smaller reduction in the average
consumption. In other words, there is a lower moral hazard cost associated with a longer benefit
duration, and the government can “afford” to choose a longer duration. The drop in the moral
hazard cost is amplified by a drop in job posting—result of the lower productivity and hence a lower
expected future profit—which lowers the response of future unemployment to changes in the duration
policy. This amplification accounts for the nonlinear shape of the duration policy with respect to
productivity.
The variations of the marginal welfare gain and cost here are consistent with recent empirical
findings by Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015). First, they find that the moral hazard cost is procyclical.
The marginal cost of moral hazard here varies positively with both the unemployment and produc-
tivity and is overall procyclical.30 Second, they find that the marginal welfare gain from consumption
30 While we distinguish between a drop in productivity and an increases in unemployment, the empirical work of
Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015) does not. So their finding that moral hazard cost is higher when the unemployment rate
is lower should not be directly compared to the left panel of Figure 4.
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Figure 5: Impulse response to a 1% drop in productivity.
smoothing varies positively with the unemployment but the variations are small. The marginal gain
from insurance in our mechanism also varies positively with unemployment, but the scale of variation
is large. This is because the gain from consumption smoothing that they document correspond to
the intensive margin in (20), which is only part of the gain from insurance in our mechanism. Most
of the variations in the gain from insurance in the left panel of Figure 4 come from the extensive
margin.
5.3 Impulse response in policy and labor market
To illustrate how government policy and the private sector interact in the Markov equilibrium we
now consider the economy’s response to a one-time, unanticipated drop in productivity. Figure 5
shows the response of the economy to a 1% drop in productivity 𝑧 at time 0. We first focus on the
responses in the Markov equilibrium (solid blue lines). We then compare the Markov equilibrium
to an economy without the government policy changes (dotted red lines) to understand the driving
force behind the movements in the labor market.31 Because the transitional dynamics are relatively
31 The online appendix provides impulse responses of additional labor market statistics.
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slow, it takes a long time for the economy to return to a steady state. In Figure 5, the time horizon
is 90 months or approximately seven and a half years.
Upon shock, the benefit duration rises immediately from 26.3 weeks to 33 weeks and then falls
slowly as productivity recovers. By month 30, the benefit duration has fallen to 29 weeks. Since the
unemployment is a slow-moving process, it peaks at around month 7, when productivity has already
recovered one-fifth of the 1% drop. Because the benefit duration increases in unemployment, the
drop in the benefit duration after the initial rise is slowed down by the rising unemployment. Benefit
level, in contrast, falls initially to below steady state, with less than 1% total change, and slowly
recovers to the pre-shock steady state as both productivity and unemployment recover.32
Search by the unemployed workers both with and without benefits fall initially, which drives the
average search down by about 10%. While the drop in search by those without benefits primarily
comes from lower expected future wages, the drop for the unemployed workers with benefits is
additionally driven by a longer expected benefit duration. Vacancy posting also falls initially but
the recovery is much quicker than the overall job search recovery. By month 6, vacancy posting
is more than half-way back to the pre-shock steady-state level. This is because vacancy posting
depends on the expected future productivity and aggregate search. As search by the individual
unemployed workers recovers, and with high unemployment during the first few months after shock,
aggregate search is high. Because higher aggregate search increases the marginal return from vacancy
posting, in equilibrium vacancy posting responds to the aggregate (and not average) search.33 Total
unemployment increases rapidly to peak in month 7, before gradually falling back to its steady-state
level.
To understand to what extent the rise in unemployment is driven by changes in productivity
versus policy, we shut down the changes in government policy. Compared to the unemployment
increase with policy changes (solid blue lines), the increase without policy change (dotted red lines)
is much more muted (1pp versus 5pp). Underlying this difference in unemployment change are
smaller drops in both search and vacancy posting without policy change. In particular, the average
search drops by less than 1%, compared to a 9% decrease with policy changes. The drop in vacancy
posting without policy changes is about half of the drop with policy change. This shows that job
search incentives are directly distorted by policy changes whereas vacancy posting incentives respond
mostly to productivity.
32 The benefit level in our model is slightly procyclical. This is because during a recession, lower wages and higher
total unemployment raise the marginal cost (in utility terms) of providing benefits. Even though the scale of changes
is small, the procyclical benefits go against what happens in a typical recession. To be more realistic, it is reasonable
to think that during a recession, the government has a more relaxed budget which allows it to keep the benefit level
constant.
33 Mechanically, in our setup because wages are exogenous, labor market tightness does not respond to changes in
search or vacancy posting. So when the aggregate search increases, vacancy posting also increases to keep tightness
constant.
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6 UI Duration Extensions in Recession
Because the cyclical properties of the Markov equilibrium policy rules are consistent with those of the
U.S. policy, in this section we use the theoretical framework to study recessions. We first validate the
model by using the model to account for the benefit duration variations during and after the Great
Recession (December 2007 to December 2013). We then compare the Markov policy to alternative
UI policies to study the impacts on unemployment and welfare.
Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Unemployment rate
Figure 6: Empirical changes in unemployment (right axis) and UI duration (left axis) during recessions since
the 1970s.
6.1 Empirical evidence of UI benefit extensions in recessions
We first document the variations in UI duration during each recession since the 1970s. Figure 6 plots
the variations in unemployment and UI duration during all five recession episodes.34 The shaded
regions mark National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) official recession dates. For each reces-
34 The recession from January to July 1980 was both shorter and milder than the other recessions. In addition, it
was followed immediately by the much longer recession from July 1981 to November 1982. We therefore leave out the
former recession period.
24
sion episode, the dotted red line (right axis) plots the unemployment rate, and the solid blue line (left
axis) plots the maximum expected UI duration in weeks. The timing and the size of changes in the
UI duration follow the specifics of the federal unemployment compensation laws, which are available
from the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration (DOLETA) website.
Two things are worth noting. First, during all recession episodes, the UI duration reached its highest
level around the time the unemployment peaked. Second, comparing across recessions, the recession
with higher unemployment is in general associated with higher expected UI durations, expect for the
1980s recession. Our Markov equilibrium benefit duration rises with the total unemployment, which
is consistent with the above historical evidence.
Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Weighted UI duration (weeks) UI legislation dates
Figure 7: Empirical changes in UI duration and timing of UI-related legislation during the Great Recession.
Because more detailed data are available for the Great Recession, we document the frequency
of legislation on UI policy during and following this recession in Figure 7. The vertical dotted lines
indicate the timings of legislation. The frequency of legislation increased substantially from the
mid-2008, especially from the late 2009, to 2011. This provides evidence that during the recessions
the federal government does not follow a prescribed policy rule and instead makes policy choices
depending on the contemporary states of the economy.35 This observation motivates our choice to
use the Markov equilibrium policy, which is time consistent, to describe the policy changes during
the recession.
Because the state-level implementations of UI benefit extension are conditional on the state’s
35 There is an automatic benefit extensions program called Extended Benefits (EB), whereby the benefit duration is
automatically extended when a state’s unemployment rate exceeds 6.5% or 8%. The EB extensions are triggered in a
state regardless of the national economic conditions or what the Congress decides. So in a sense this is a committed
extensions program, in contrast to the discretionary extensions implemented in recessions. During the Great Recession,
the EB extensions represent about one-third of the total overall maximum extensions. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for pointing this out.
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economic conditions, especially on the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) and total unem-
ployment rate (TUR), we use the two statistics to compute whether the state was eligible for longer
durations in the month a UI-related legislation was passed during the Great Recession. We then
create a weighted measure of the maximum expected UI durations across states using the number
of total insured unemployed workers in each state as weights. Appendix A provides more details on
the dates of policy changes and the construction of this weighted measure of UI duration. Figure 7
plots the weighted expected UI duration (dashed blue line). For the quantitative analyses, we use
this weighted average series as the empirical counterpart for a more accurate description of the UI
duration policy implemented.
6.2 The Great Recession
Figure 8: Exogenous shock processes during the Great Recession.
To further our theory, we put the model in an environment similar to the U.S. economy during
and following the Great Recession from December 2007 to December 2013. Because our theory
focuses on UI, we specify a path for productivity to match the observed unemployment path during
the period.36 We use a piecewise linear productivity path consisting of the decline, the trough and
the recovery. It turns out that this simplified way of calibrating the productivity path generates a
good fit for the path of unemployment. We use an exogenous series of job separation rates over this
period calculated from the aggregate-level CPS data. This path is then fed into the model assuming
they are unexpected shocks and the agents expect future separation rate to return to its steady
state. In Section 6.2.3 we look at the case where the agents have an expectation about how future
36 The online appendix includes two alternative calibrations where we use productivity 𝑧 to either match the path
of UI duration or get a best fit for both unemployment and duration. The benchmark calibration of the productivity
path here is the preferred one because while unemployment is a smooth process (and reported on a weekly basis), UI
duration is not, because Congress meets on a relatively fixed schedule that typically does not respond to changes in
the economic conditions. Therefore, matching to the UI duration series is subject to the underlying assumptions about
meeting schedules.
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Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
Figure 9: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession: Model, data, and counter-
factual policies.
job separation rate evolves. Figure 8 plots these two shock paths.37
Model Fit Given the exogenous shock paths, Figure 9 plots the variations in the UI duration, labor
market variables, and average welfare generated by the Markov equilibrium (solid blue lines). Com-
pared to the U.S. economy (dashed black lines), the Markov equilibrium matches well the variations
of UI duration and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. In particular, the Markov equilibrium benefit
duration policy rises from 26 weeks to slightly below 80 weeks, compared to the maximum of 90
weeks in the U.S. economy. The Markov equilibrium also generates a decline in the benefit duration,
37 The path we specify for labor productivity is in fact not far-fetched. Labor productivity as measured by the
average production per person in the nonfarm business sector fell by 3% from the end of 2007 to the beginning of
2009, which is more than 4% in detrended terms. The difference between our calibrated path and the actual path is
the recovery part. The U.S. labor productivity recovered swiftly to the pre-2008 level by the end of 2010, whereas our
path follows a slower recovery process. For theories on slow and/or jobless recovery following the Great Recession,
see, for example, Stock and Watson (2012), Shimer (2012), and Heathcote and Perri (2015). In addition, McGrattan
and Prescott (2010, 2014) suggest that labor productivity calculated from the data—especially during the 1990s and
the Great Recession—are mismeasured. This paper does not take a stand on what the true labor productivity is, and
instead uses the observed unemployment path to discipline productivity.
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but the decline starts sooner than in the U.S. economy. The Markov equilibrium captures the sud-
den drop and the slow rise in the vacancy-unemployment ratio as observed in the U.S. economy, but
underestimates the scale of the drop. One reason for the smaller drop in the vacancy-unemployment
ratio is that the model does not have job-to-job transition. During recessions, job-to-job transition,
in addition to unemployment-to-job transition, declines, and as a result, vacancy posting should
decline more when job-to-job transition is taken into account.
6.2.1 Policy evaluation
One interesting question we can answer using the model is whether and how much the benefit
extensions contributed to the higher unemployment rates during the Great Recession. We analyze
a counterfactual where the government does not do benefit extensions but instead keeps benefit
duration at 26 weeks throughout the recession (and the private sector fully understands it). Figure 9
shows that, in contrast to the no-extension policy (dotted red line), the Markov equilibrium benefit
extensions lead to higher unemployment rates. At the peak, the unemployment is lower by more
than 3 percentage points in the economy without extensions.38
A key prediction of our theory is that search effort is procyclical, that it falls during recessions.
This feature is present in the standard search model with endogenous search effort. The empirical
findings on the cyclicality of search effort are mixed.39 More recently, Gomme and Lkhagvasuren
(2015), after controlling for the heterogeneity in the unemployed worker’s past wages and hours, find
evidence that search is procyclical, consistent with the prediction of the structural search literature.
Welfare Evaluations We compute the consumption equivalent variation under a utilitarian welfare
function; that is, the welfare function in each period is
𝑊 (𝑐𝑤,𝑐0,𝑐1,𝑠0,𝑠1,𝑢,𝑢1,𝑑) = (1− 𝑢)𝑈 (𝑐𝑤) worker
+(𝑢− 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)) [︀𝑈(𝑐0)− 𝑣(𝑠0)]︀ unemployed without benefit
+𝑢1(1− 𝑑) [︀𝑈(𝑐1)− 𝑣(𝑠1)]︀ unemployed with benefit.
This is also the period welfare function of the government in the Markov equilibrium. It captures
the effects of higher income (both wages and benefits), larger proportions of unemployed workers on
benefits, lower lump-sum taxes, and gains from saving on search effort.
We perform the welfare evaluation of extensions at two points in time. First, consistent with how
the effect on unemployment is evaluated, we look at the ex-post welfare. This is computed at each
38 Even though both productivity and job separation rate fluctuations contribute to the cyclical movements in the
model, the productivity changes actually drive most of the movements. The online appendix provides an analysis where
productivity is kept at its steady-state level to isolate the effect of the shock to job separation rate.
39 Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama, Patterson, and Şahin (2006), for example, find countercyclical search effort, while
DeLoach and Kurt (2013) find evidence of procyclical search effort. See Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2015) for a brief
review of the empirical literature on search effort.
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point in time over the transition path after the realization of shocks each period:
2013.12∑︁
𝑡=2008.1
𝛽𝑡𝑊 (𝑐𝑤𝑡 ,𝑐0𝑡 ,𝑐1𝑡 ,𝑠0𝑡 ,𝑠1𝑡 ,𝑢𝑡,𝑢1𝑡 ,𝑑𝑡) =
2013.12∑︁
𝑡=2008.1
𝛽𝑡𝑊 (𝑐𝑤𝑡 (1+ ∆),𝑐0𝑡 (1+ ∆),𝑐1𝑡 (1+ ∆), ?˜?0𝑡 , ?˜?1𝑡 , ?˜?𝑡, ?˜?1𝑡 ,𝑑𝑡)
where the left-hand side is the aggregate welfare of the Markov equilibrium economy, ?˜? on the right-
hand side are the equilibrium allocations under the no-extension policy, and ∆ is the consumption
equivalent variation. We allow the distribution of workers to vary in the welfare calculation to capture
the distributional effects of different policies on welfare. The last panel of Figure 9 plots the welfare
during this period. Even though the Markov equilibrium extensions substantially raised the unem-
ployment, the average welfare is higher with the Markov extensions. The difference in the average
welfare over the transition path roughly translates into 0.16% of average monthly consumption.
The ex-post welfare gap between the Markov equilibrium and no-extensions economies in Figure 9
are driven by two opposing forces: the higher unemployment in the Markov equilibrium reduces the
average welfare in the economy relative to the no-extensions policy, whereas the higher proportion of
unemployed workers on benefits increases the average welfare of unemployed workers in the Markov
economy. Figure 10 illustrates these two forces.
Markov extensions policy No extensions policy
Figure 10: Drivers of welfare gap between Markov extensions and no extensions policies: Unemployment and
proportion unemployed on benefits.
The proportion of unemployed workers on benefits (middle panel) is calculated as 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)/𝑢.
Under the no-extensions policy (dotted red lines), the proportion falls early in the recession. While
both the measure of benefit-eligible unemployed worker, 𝑢1, and the total unemployment, 𝑢, increase
in response to rising job separation rates and falling productivity, the rise in the total unemployment
is larger because job-finding rates of the unemployed workers both with and without benefits fall. In
contrast, in the Markov equilibrium, the initial rise in the proportion is mainly driven by the longer
duration policy (lower 𝑑).
The gap in benefit coverage between the two policies increases over time. At the time when the
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unemployment peaks, about 60% of unemployed workers are covered by UI benefits in the Markov
equilibrium, whereas only 40% have benefits under the no-extensions policy. This higher benefit
coverage leads to higher average welfare among the unemployed workers in the Markov equilibrium.
The welfare gap (right panel) between the Markov and no-extensions policies is then the result of
the welfare cost of higher unemployment being outweighed by the welfare gain from a higher benefit
coverage ratio. An important reason for this result is that productivity is low during the recession,
which lowers the marginal cost of unemployment, making welfare higher in the high-unemployment-
long-duration economy.
Second, we compare the welfare at the start of the recession. This is an ex-ante comparison:
E2008.1
∞∑︁
𝑡=2008.1
𝛽𝑡𝑊 (𝑐𝑤𝑡 ,𝑐0𝑡 ,𝑐1𝑡 ,𝑠0𝑡 ,𝑠1𝑡 ,𝑢𝑡,𝑢1𝑡 ,𝑑𝑡)
= E2008.1
∞∑︁
𝑡=2008.1
𝛽𝑡𝑊 (𝑐𝑤𝑡 (1+ ∆),𝑐0𝑡 (1+ ∆),𝑐1𝑡 (1+ ∆), ?˜?0𝑡 , ?˜?1𝑡 , ?˜?𝑡, ?˜?1𝑡 ,𝑑𝑡)
The difference here is the ex-ante evaluation is done without the knowledge of how the recession
would pan out, and agents in the economy expect future shocks to follow an AR(1) process. We
assume that an unexpected productivity shock occurs in January 2008, and perform the welfare
comparison after the realization of this shock. The question addressed by this exercise is, “should
the government follow the Markov rule or the no-extensions policy given this shock?” Interestingly,
the no-extensions policy gives slightly higher (less than 0.1% in consumption equivalent) average
welfare than the Markov policy rule ex ante. The reason for the different ex-ante and ex-post welfare
results is that during this period the productivity slump turns out to be both long and severe, which
gives more justification ex-post for the Markov equilibrium extensions.
6.2.2 The effect of expectation
Private sector’s expectations of future policy play an important role in the Markov equilibrium.
To isolate the effect of expectation in our result, we shut down the channel of private sector’s
expectations. In particular, in this exercise we assume that ex ante the private sector expects the
future benefit duration (and benefit level) to stay at the steady-state level, but ex post the government
implements the benefit extensions as in the Markov equilibrium. In other words, all benefit extensions
above the regular 26 weeks are “unanticipated.” Figure 11 illustrates the experiment by comparing
the economy under (1) the Markov equilibrium benefit extensions policy (solid blue lines), (2) the
no-extensions policy (dotted red lines), and (3) the unexpected extensions policy (dashed green lines).
The unemployment gap between the Markov extensions and the unexpected extensions policies
is large, accounting for about 70% of the unemployment gap between the Markov extensions and
the no-extensions economies. This reflects the importance of expectations. When the unemployed
workers with benefits rationally expect the government to follow the Markov equilibrium policy, they
reduce their job search activities when the productivity is low or when the unemployment is high,
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Markov extensions policy No extensions policy ∙ Unexpected extensions policy
Figure 11: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession: Effect of expectation.
because the expected long benefit duration next period distorts their search incentives. In contrast,
when the unemployed workers expect the government to maintain a no-extensions policy, they do
not reduce search as much.
Because the distortion on the search incentives works only through the unemployed worker’s
expectation of future UI policies, this exercise is also a decomposition of the unemployment gap
into the “search” wedge and the “composition” wedge. Specifically, the unemployment difference
between the economies with the Markov equilibrium extensions (solid blue lines) and the unexpected
extensions (dashed green lines) represents the effect of policy distortion on search behavior; the
unemployment difference between the economies with the unexpected extensions and no extensions
(dotted red lines) represents the compositional effect—a longer duration increases the proportion of
unemployed workers with benefits, thus reducing average search.
Interestingly, the average welfare in the unexpected extensions economy is higher than in the
Markov equilibrium. This is not surprising, because the former has both high current consumption—
from the ex-post benefit extensions—and low future unemployment—from the expectation of a no-
31
extensions policy ex ante. But such an economy is in a sense “unsustainable” as it requires the
government to be always able to “fool” the private sector.40
6.2.3 Cyclical job separation risk
In the benchmark the cyclical job separation rate is both exogenous and unexpected. As a robustness
check, we make the job separation shock contingent on productivity in the model, so that the private
sector takes into consideration the cyclical job separation rate—and form expectations accordingly—
when making decisions. We specify the job separation rate process as
𝛿(𝑧) = 𝛿 + 𝐼𝛿(𝑧 − 𝑧),
where 𝛿 is the steady-state job separation rate, and 𝐼𝛿 < 0 is the rate of change of the separation
rate with respect to the aggregate productivity. Note that the private sector forms expectations
based on this process, but the realized separate rate is still the series taken from data as before.
This formulation has the natural interpretation that the job separation rate increases when profits
are low. When labor productivity is low, wages are low as wages are also a function of productivity.
Because the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity is less than 1, lower productivity means
lower profit, or 𝑧 −𝑤 in the model. To estimate this process we use the job separation and labor
productivity data over 1951.I-2014.IV.
As before, the productivity shock 𝑧 is exogenously specified to match the unemployment process.
The resulting labor productivity path has a smaller drop than before—3.2% as opposed to 3.6% in
the benchmark when the separation rate changes are unexpected. This is because a countercyclical
separation rate shock reinforces the effect of the productivity shock. When the productivity is low,
firms expect a large future separation rate, and as a result they reduce vacancy postings even more
than in the benchmark. Figure 12 shows the transition paths for this alternate specification.
6.3 Other recessions
As noted in the empirical analysis, benefit extensions are not unique to the Great Recession. Com-
paring across recession episodes since the 1970s, those with higher unemployment were associated
with, in general, higher benefit durations.41 In this section, we test whether our model delivers this
characteristic. Because of declining secular trends in job-finding and separation rates, we need to
recalibrate the model parameters to the pre-recession economy for each recession episode. Table 4
summarizes the labor market statistics for the pre-recession window for each recession.
40 This is similar to the Lucas (1972, 1976) argument that only unexpected inflation has a positive impact on
real output, and attempts by governments to exploit this unexpectedness will lead agents to revise their inflation
expectations.
41 Even though benefit extension programs existed since the 1950s, it was not until the 1973-1975 recession that the
federal government started actively adjusting extensions. Such active adjustment corresponds to our interpretation of
a discretionary policy. We thus focus on recessions since the mid-1970s.
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Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
Figure 12: With cyclical separation risk: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession.
As with the Great Recession, we use the path of job separation rate from data, and target
the observed unemployment path to recover the path of productivity for each recession. Figure 13
displays the model-generated UI duration (solid blue lines), unweighted UI duration from the data
(dashed blue lines), and the model-generated unemployment (broken red lines, right axis) for each
recession documented in the empirical analysis. Three observations are worth noting. First, the
model matches the increases in the UI duration reasonably well, producing more than 60% of the
increases (solid blue line vs. dashed blue line) in each recession. Second, consistent with patterns
documented from the data, during all four recessions, the model-generated UI duration reached its
highest level around the time the unemployment peaked. Lastly, recessions where the unemployment
was higher (broken red line) also had, in general, higher model-generated UI duration (solid blue
line), except in the 1980s recession. This evidence shows that, as an additional model validation,
our theory is able to generate not only quantitatively significant UI duration increases in recessions,
but also cross-time patterns consistent with the data.
While our model can rationalize the benefit extensions during recessions, our theory is not suc-
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Table 4: Calibration Targets for Other Recessions
Pre-recession labor market statistics
Recession Pre-recession period Separation Job finding Job filling
Nov 1973-Mar 1975 1973.I-1973.III 0.026 0.51 0.71
Jul 1981-Nov 1982 1980.II-1981.I 0.033 0.41 0.71
Jul 1990-Mar 1991 1988.I-1990.II 0.027 0.47 0.71
Mar 2001-Nov 2001 1999.I-2000.IV 0.020 0.49 0.66
Note: Job-filling rate pre-2000 are from Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
Model: Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Data: UI duration (weeks)
Model: Unemployment (right axis)
Figure 13: UI duration and unemployment in other recessions: Model versus data
cessful in generating the lack of actions during non-recessionary times. In fact, our model predicts
when productivity rises and unemployment falls, the government has incentives to reduce benefit
duration to below 26 weeks. However, it is worth noting that the response of the Markov equilibrium
policy to productivity is not entirely symmetric. Instead, the changes in the duration policy are very
nonlinear; its increase over regions of low productivity is much faster than its decrease over regions
of high productivity.42 As a result, even though the government has incentives to reduce UI duration
during non-recessionary times, the reduction is much smaller than the increase during a recession.
42 Shown in Figure 3 and discussed in Section 5.2.
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6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Relation to commitment (Ramsey) policy
A recent strand of the UI literature looks at the optimal UI policy over the business cycle under the
assumption of perfect commitment by the government (e.g. Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), Jung and
Kuester (2015)). Our time-consistent no-commitment policy complements this literature by relaxing
the commitment assumption on the government. A key difference between the two policies is that
the government without commitment does not internalize the effect of future policy on today’s search
incentives, whereas the government with commitment does. As a result, the optimal commitment
(Ramsey) policy is less generous, and the steady state unemployment is lower than that under the
time-consistent no-commitment policy. Over the business cycle when the unemployment is high, the
government with commitment (Ramsey) realizes that a short benefit duration creates search incentive
for more workers, so it is ex ante optimal to promise a short benefit duration. Consistently, Mitman
and Rabinovich (2015) find that the optimal benefit duration under commitment is procyclical43.
In contrast, a government without commitment cannot make a promise, which is why we find time-
consistent non-commitment policy is countercyclical.
Note that commitment is assumed in the Ramsey case. If given the choice to break a promise,
the government will find it optimal at any time to deviate from the promised policy schedule. More
specifically, the government at time 𝑡 has an incentive to promise a short future benefit duration to
encourage search, because current search (mainly search of the benefit-collecting unemployed work-
ers) is higher when the expected future benefit duration is shorter. However, after the employment
outcome in period 𝑡 is realized, the government has an incentive to provide insurance to more un-
employed workers by choosing a longer duration. This incentive to deviate from the original plan
is what constitutes the time inconsistency in the Ramsey problem. By allowing the government to
break its promise, the time-consistent policy that we look at is arguably closer to reality.
6.4.2 Relation to Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015)
The comparison between the Markov economy and the no-extensions economy is in line with Hage-
dorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015), who exploit discontinuity at state borders to identify the effect
of unemployment benefit extensions. In particular, one way to interpret their empirical result is as
follows. In states where firms and workers expect good exogenous shocks to the economy, e.g. an
oil boom, they also expect lower or no benefit extensions. This increases the expected value of
43 Jung and Kuester (2015) find the response of the optimal UI benefits to business cycle fluctuations is short-lived
because they consider multiple policy instruments; when the government is only allowed to change UI benefits, they
find the policy responses are similar to Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) find
the optimal (Ramsey) UI benefits should be countercyclical, higher when the unemployment is higher; however, as
Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) point out, the analysis in Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) rests on a steady state
comparison and is thus not directly comparable to our results. We find the Ramsey policy in our setup behaves very
similarly to that in Mitman and Rabinovich (2015).
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employment to a worker and in turn increases job creation compared to states with bad economic
outlooks. This interpretation is very similar to our theory. With the Markov equilibrium policy, firms
and workers expect longer benefit durations in recessions—analogous to states with bad economic
outlooks—whereas in the no-extensions economy, the private sector expects no-extensions policy—an
extreme case of states with good exogenous shocks.
Markov extensions policy No extensions policy
Figure 14: Markov extensions versus no extensions policy: Vacancy posting and average search.
One difference between our theory and Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015) lies in the
mechanism underlying our results. In their model, a longer benefit duration increases the unemployed
worker’s outside option, thus increasing their reservation wage. Higher reservation wages then reduce
the firm’s vacancy posting by reducing profit margin. In our model, a longer expected duration
makes unemployment less painful for workers and thus reduces job search activity. Reduced search
activity then reduces the marginal return to vacancy posting, leading to a lower vacancy posting
in equilibrium.44 To see how much of the unemployment gap in Figure 9 comes from differences
in vacancy posting as opposed to job search, Figure 14 compares the Markov equilibrium and the
no-extensions economy along these two dimensions. Both vacancy posting and average search are
higher in the no-extensions economy, but the gap is much larger for average search. This result
indicates that in our model both vacancy posting and search contribute to the unemployment gap,
but average search is a quantitatively more important channel.
6.4.3 Other policy instruments
In our analysis we consider UI as the only policy instrument. In reality, the government can use a
number of other labor market and social insurance policies alongside UI. Jung and Kuester (2015)
analyze the optimal mix of unemployment insurance, hiring subsidy, production tax and layoff tax
44 With exogenous wages, labor market tightness does not respond to changes in search or vacancy posting. Me-
chanically, when aggregate search is lower, vacancy posting is also lower to keep tightness constant. As a result, in
equilibrium the marginal return to search and vacancy posting stays constant for the same productivity level.
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over the business cycle. They find that, compared to unemployment insurance, hiring subsidies
and layoff taxes stimulate job creation without sacrificing the unemployed workers’ consumption in
recessions. As a result, during recessions the government does not rely on UI as much as when it
was the only instrument available. In other words, policy instruments affecting the firm side crowd
out UI.
In our setup, such firm-side policies, would similarly crowd out the use of UI extension policies
during recessions. We choose to focus on UI primarily because this is the policy with the largest
cyclical variations in the U.S., especially during the most recent recession. Underlying this observa-
tion is the possibility that the firm-side policies may be harder to implement and so the government
relies heavily on UI during recessions.45
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a quantitative theory of the government’s choice of UI policy without the as-
sumption of perfect commitment by the government. We study the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a
search and matching model, which delivers a time-consistent UI policy where the government makes
UI benefit level and duration choices each period contingent on the current payoff-relevant aggre-
gate states of the economy. Our methodology is empirically relevant as supported by the frequent
and haphazard benefit extensions during recessions, which we document. We find that the time-
consistent benefit policies are consistent with the countercyclical UI extensions during recessions.
Quantitatively, the endogenous benefit duration generated by the model matches the timing and the
size of benefit extensions during the Great Recession.
Using a calibrated version of the model to evaluate the benefit extensions between 2008 and
2013, we find that the endogenous variations in the UI duration accounted for a 3 percentage-point
increase in the unemployment rate at its peak, of which two-thirds was driven by the unemployed
workers’ expectation of longer future benefit durations. Our results thus highlight the importance
of expectations in Markov equilibrium and in policy implementation. Another interesting finding is
that even though the benefit extensions created higher unemployment, it actually improved welfare
ex post during 2008-2013 compared to a no-extensions policy.
Several simplifying assumptions are made for tractability. First, neither workers nor government
can save or borrow. Because savings provide self-insurance to workers, allowing workers to save
will reduce the need for government-provided insurance policy. At the same time, credit access
may reduce search by the unemployed (see, for example, Herkenhoff (2015)), thus exacerbating
moral hazard problem. The reduced need for insurance and increased moral hazard problem will
likely reduce the cyclical response of benefit duration. Allowing government access to the credit
market will increase the cyclical fluctuations of benefit duration and likely make the benefit level less
procyclical (or more acyclical). This is because the government can borrow to finance a generous
45 More recently, hiring subsidies are introduced in the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010.
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benefit policy in bad times and pay back the debt with tax revenue in good times.
Another assumption is that government policy takes effect right away. In reality, there often
is a time lag between legislation and implementation. Allowing the government to announce pol-
icy changes before implementation gives workers and firms time to react to the potential changes,
which may mitigate the effect of policy changes (“announcement effect”). However, by looking at UI
legislations during the Great Recession, we find that most extensions came into effect shortly after
announcement. Furthermore, the announcement effect, if any, is likely small quantitatively. Naka-
jima (2012), for example, incorporates announcement effect in his evaluation of benefit extensions
and finds small quantitative effect associated with policy announcement.
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A Unemployment Insurance Benefit Extensions in the Great
Recession
The U.S. government has extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration during recessions since the
1950s. During normal nonrecessionary times, an eligible unemployed worker may receive UI benefits for up
to 26 weeks in most states under the regular UI program. During economic downturns, automatic benefits
extensions are triggered under the Extended Benefits (EB) program, whereby additional 13 or 20 weeks are
added on top of the usual 26 weeks of maximum benefits. The number of additional weeks depends on
the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) or the total unemployment rate (TUR). In addition, during
each recession since the 1970s, the federal government has financed extra benefit extensions depending on
the economy. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) were launched in 2008 in response to
high unemployment. The program extended benefits in waves based on evaluations of unemployment and the
underlying economic situation. Four waves called “Tiers” were implemented progressively between Nov 2008
and the end of 2013. Tiers I was effective without any conditions on the states’ unemployment level. Tiers II,
III and IV required certain condition on the states’ IUR and/or TUR to take place.
We use the series of the IUR and TUR for 51 U.S. states to compute if the state was eligible for the EB and
the EUC08 programs during any month between 2008 and 2013. This gives us the maximum duration of UI
benefits for each state over time. We follow the methodology in Albertini and Poirier (2015) and weight these
series to build an aggregate indicator. We use the the number of total insured unemployed workers in the state
divided by the total insured unemployed workers in the U.S. as weights. Statistics on insured unemployment
population come from the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration (DOLETA).
Table 5 reports a timeline for policy changes and unweighted expected maximum duration under the EUC08
and EB programs.
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Table 5: Federally-Funded Unemployment Insurance Extensions 2008-2013
Start date Program extension of EUC08 End date Additional Weeks
Jul 2008 13 weeks for all states Nov 2008 13
Nov 2008 Tier I: 20 weeks for all states Mar 2009 33
Tier II: 13 weeks for states with TUR ≥ 6%
Mar 2009 keep exisiting structure Nov 2009 33
Nov 2009 Tier I - 20 weeks for all states Dec 2009 53
Tier II: 14 weeks for all states
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5%
Dec 2009 keep exisiting structure Aug 2010 53
Mar 2010 keep exisiting structure Sep 2010 53
Apr 2010 keep exisiting structure Nov 2010 53
Jul 2010 keep exisiting structure May 2011 53
Dec 2010 keep exisiting structure Jun 2012 53
Dec 2011 keep exisiting structure Aug 2012 53
Feb 2012 Tier I: 20 weeks for all states May 2012 53
Tier II: 14 weeks for all states
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5%
(16 weeks if no active EB and TUR ≥ 8.5%)
Jun 2012 Tier I: 20 weeks for all states Sep 2012 53
Tier II: 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%
Sep 2012 Tier I: 14 weeks for all states Dec 2012 47
Tier II: 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III: 9 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%
Tier IV: 10 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%
Jan 2013 keep exisiting structure Dec 2013 47
Start date Program extension of EB End date Additional Weeks
Feb 2009 6.5% 13 week IUR and IUR ≥ 110% of prior 3 years Dec 2013 138% 13 week IUR and IUR ≥ 110% of prior 3 years 26
Source: DOLETA, Whittaker and Isaacs (2013), Albertini and Poirier (2015)
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